Abstract
A game with one-sided moral hazard is represented by a two-stage game. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the folk theorem to hold. Equilibrium payoffs are generated by payoffs from pure strategy profiles which do not admit profitable nondetectable deviations. The enforceable maximin payoff is shown to be a better notion for the individually rational payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D8
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