Abstract
Smart wearable devices, as a popular mobile device, have a broad market. Smart wearable medical devices implemented in wearable health monitoring systems can monitor the data pertaining to a patient’s body and let the patient know their own physical condition. In addition, these data can be stored, analyzed, and processed in the cloud to effectively prevent diseases. As an Internet-of-things technology, fog computing can process, store, and control data around devices in real time. However, the distributed attributes of fog nodes make the monitored body data and medical reports at risk of privacy disclosure. In this paper, we propose a fog-driven secure authentication and key exchange scheme for wearable health monitoring systems. Furthermore, we conduct a formal analysis using the Real-Oracle-Random model, Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic, and ProVerif tools and an informal analysis to perform security verification. Finally, a performance comparison with other related schemes shows that the proposed scheme has the best advantages in terms of security, computing overhead, and communication cost.
Highlights
Introduction eInternet of things (IoT) [1, 2] refers to the communication, transmission, analysis, and control between things through the Internet
We propose a fog-driven secure authentication and key exchange scheme for wearable health monitoring systems to ensure the security and privacy of the monitoring information and diagnostic reports of smart wearable medical devices (SWMDs)
(2) Using the Real-Oracle-Random (ROR) model, we provide the probability of breaking the symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms and prove that our protocol has a secure authentication process and session key
Summary
(i) Utilized one-way hash function (ii) Dynamic string generating algorithm (ii) Does not resist desynchronization attacks (iii) Does not resist denial-of-service attacks (iv) Does not resist internal attacks. (i) Utilized one-way hash function (ii) Utilized ECC (i) Does not provide traceability (ii) Does not resist clogging attacks (2) Using the Real-Oracle-Random (ROR) model, we provide the probability of breaking the symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms and prove that our protocol has a secure authentication process and session key. E remainder of this paper is organized as follows. E entire scheme consists of four phases: initialization, SWMD registration, fog node registration, and AKA. H(sF‖s)⊕h in the database and sends RIDF, sF to Fj. After receiving the response, Fj calculates PF rF⊕h(IDF‖sF‖RIDF) and stores.
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