Fodor y Kim en torno a la posibilidad de las ciencias especiales, la realizabilidad múltiple y el reduccionismo

Abstract

The supposed crucial argument that refutes reductionism once and for all is the idea of the multiple realizability (MR) of the higher or non-physical properties. Introducing and developing this notion, authors such as Putnam and Fodor philosophically reaffirmed the status of the special sciences as autonomous sciences with explanatory nomological pretensions. In total opposition, Kim constructs a very peculiar argument that takes the MR as its premise and concludes in the reduction of the special sciences. In the first part of the article I analyze Kim’s reasoning and show its fundamental dependence on the so-called causal inheritance principle, which holds that the higher causal powers, including mental ones, are derived from, given that they are realized by and supervenient on, the physical causal powers. In the second I examine Fodor’s response in terms of realizers located at metaphysically possible worlds different to ours. In the third, I argue that MR is not sufficient to maintain an anti-reductionist position, and that we must add the rejection of the Kim’s causal inheritance principle, which would have to be articulated in terms of downward causation.