Fodor and the naturalist's problem: A response to Garrett and Graham

Abstract

Garrett and Graham (1986) take up the defense of naturalistic psychology against the peculiar claim of Fodor that naturalistic psychology is a practical impossibility. On the face of it, Fodor’s claim is remarkable to say the least, especially to those who have been under the impression that naturalistic psychology is not only possible but already well under way as a viable enterprise (perhaps even dating back as far as Aristotle). To understand why such a debate should be taking place at all, it will be helpful to get clear on what the naturalist’s problem is, as well as on what Fodor thinks it is. As naturalistic psychology is usually understood, the core problem is to give some systematic account of the interactions between organisms and their environments. This problem can be construed in a number of ways, and attacked accordingly. One can investigate stimuli and responses without explanatory recourse to mental events or constructs, as the behaviorist does. Or if one is disinclined toward strict behaviorism, one can attempt to retain mentalism by somehow identifying mind with the organism-environment interactions themselves (James, Dewey). Or one can even remain a naturalist while going on to posit mental events underlying those interactions. In any case, as long as the focus is on organism+nvironment interactions, the naturalist will aim to provide general statements relating aspects or dimensions of the organism (whether construed as an emitter of responses or as a possessor of mental states) to those of the environment. The whole trick from the naturalist’s perspective is to find those particular aspects or dimensions that yield systematic relationships-in other words, to parse organism and environment in such a way that reliable relationships are revealed. As Skinner has put it, the problem is to find the “natural lines of fracture” along which organism and environment break (1961, p. 347). Generations of naturalistic psychologists have devoted themselves to some version of this task. Being a thoroughly modern mentalist, Fodor poses his own version of the naturalist’s problem. Psychology, for him, is first and foremost a computational psychology of mental states or processes, and any naturalistic psychology will have to shape itself in accordance with this conception. In particular, naturalistic psychology will have to deal with relations between thoughts (construed as propositional attitudes ranging over mental representations) and the objects of