Focus: The relationship between trade unions and employers in France

Abstract

INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 6 Volume 20 Issue 4 2013 Unions can obtain a standing within French workplaces but this is not a question of the employer choosing whether or not to recognise the union in question tribution of leaflets, posters in the name of the trade union) and take part in elections. The other four must be met, in addition, if the union intends to negotiate collective agreements. The first is the respect for republican values. The choice was made not to elaborate a list of such values, even though respect of freedom of opinion on the one hand, the rejection of any discrimination , intolerance and fundamentalism on the other hand, have primary importance. The second is independence. A union that is under the influence of the employer cannot be deemed representative. The fact that the union has received support from employers during a strike, that its members belong mostly to the Human Resources department or that it received preferential treatment from the employer (money, support for running costs) are likely to characterise the dependency of such a union towards the employer . This criterion is an application of Convention 87 of the International Labour Organisation. The third criterion is seniority. A newly formed union cannot be granted immediate representativeness . It must have, since the day of legal deposit of its statutes, a minimum period of two years at the level to which it claims its representativeness . This rule is aimed at avoiding that a union should be created in urgency for an immediate purpose, for instance bargaining on the flexibility of working time, and at permitting the implementation of the criterion of financial transparency . With two years of seniority, the union will have at least published annual accounts of its first year! The fourth criterion is financial transparency. In the last ten years, scandals have occurred concerning the financing of unions by employers’ organisations. This criterion aims at giving greater effectiveness to the test of independence; indeed, access to union accounts ensures that the union is not funded principally by the employer. The fifth criterion concerns electoral results. It is both the most difficult to reach for unions and the most symbolic under the new system. Until the statute law of 2008, trade unions did not have to be popular in the firm or in the sector, in order to be representative and, as a consequence, to negotiate a collective agreement. Representativeness now requires 10 percent of votes at firm level and 8 percent at sector or inter-sector level. The sixth and seventh criteria are the influence of the trade union in the firm and the level of their financial contributions. The low rate of union membership in France, which has a direct impact on their level of financial contributions, will probably lead the judges to evaluate these criteria with flexibility, as they did before the adoption of the 2008 Act. I n France trade unions do not need the employer ’s recognition to act within the firm, notably to bargain. The understanding of this important feature of the French system requires, before all, to have in mind two major aspects of industrial relations in France. First, relationships between unions and employers have traditionally been conflict-ridden . France has neither a tradition of co-decision (like Germany) nor a tradition of collective bargaining (like the United Kingdom). The history of employers’ organisations in France is a long chronicle of mobilisations against organised labour, with the conviction shared with labour organisations of a fundamental conflict of interests between employees and employers. The adoption of statutory duties to bargain has favoured the rise of collective bargaining that, through the years, has been granted a strong legal status. Today, collective agreements have a binding force upon all employees of the firm, even upon those who are not members of a signatory trade union (erga omnes effect). Even though a relationship of a contractual nature has emerged between unions and employers, mostly at company level, the idea that employers would recognise trade unions is unlikely to succeed in France. Second, even though employers’ organisations constantly criticise the excessive intrusion of the State in their relationships with trade unions, union representation strongly depends...