Flexible options in NATO military strategy: Deterrent or escalation trap?

Abstract

Abstract This paper evaluates the concept of “flexible response”—the initial defense of Europe with conventional forces but the flexibility to escalate a conflict by the use of nuclear weapons or retaliate directly against an aggressor—which has been the core of NATO strategy since 1967. The author contrasts the Western approach with the Soviets' view of war, which places greater importance on decisive action in the early stages of a conflict to achieve a military victory. Within the alliance, too, there are considerable differences in European and American concepts of flexibility. Equally important are the concepts of “forward defense”—utilizing NATO ground forces to harass and delay advancing forces near the inter‐German border, and strategic coupling—the reliance of NATO on the American nuclear protection to cover Soviet nuclear forces threatening Europe. The author concludes that the incompatible elements in NATO strategy must be resolved before flexible response is possible and extended deterrence is credible.