Abstract
We propose a flexible majority rule for central bank councils where the size of the majority depends monotonically on the change in interest rate within a particular time frame. Small changes in interest rate require a small share of supporting votes, even less than 50%. We show that flexible majority rules are superior to simple majority rules and can implement the optimal monetary policy under a variety of circumstances.
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