Abstract
From 1976 to 1980, the International Monetary Fund sold by sealed-bid auctions one-fifth of its gold stock and systematically experimented with auction format. Based on data from these auctions, this paper uses nonlinear estimation techniques to estimate demand curves under the alternative formats. Demand schedules at the uniform-price auctions were steeper and to the right of those at discriminatory-price auctions, upholding the predictions of bidding theory. Moreover, it is estimated that discriminating-price auctions yielded lower revenue than uniform-price auctions; Monte Carlo simulations suggest that this latter result is both robust and statistically significant.
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