Abstract
Do people use sensori-motor cortices to understand language? Here we review neurocognitive studies of language comprehension in healthy adults and evaluate their possible contributions to theories of language in the brain. We start by sketching the minimal predictions that an embodied theory of language understanding makes for empirical research, and then survey studies that have been offered as evidence for embodied semantic representations. We explore four debated issues: first, does activation of sensori-motor cortices during action language understanding imply that action semantics relies on mirror neurons? Second, what is the evidence that activity in sensori-motor cortices plays a functional role in understanding language? Third, to what extent do responses in perceptual and motor areas depend on the linguistic and extra-linguistic context? And finally, can embodied theories accommodate language about abstract concepts? Based on the available evidence, we conclude that sensori-motor cortices are activated during a variety of language comprehension tasks, for both concrete and abstract language. Yet, this activity depends on the context in which perception and action words are encountered. Although modality-specific cortical activity is not a sine qua non of language processing even for language about perception and action, sensori-motor regions of the brain appear to make functional contributions to the construction of meaning, and should therefore be incorporated into models of the neurocognitive architecture of language.
Highlights
Do people use parts of the brain involved in perception and action to understand language? The idea that meaning is grounded in perceptuo-motor states, which traces its origins at least to the philosophy of Aristotle (De Anima, Book II–III), flourished in the writings of the British Empiricists (e.g., Locke, 1690/1979)
We explore four debated issues: first, does activation of sensori-motor cortices during action language understanding imply that action semantics relies on mirror neurons? Second, what is the evidence that activity in sensori-motor cortices plays a functional role in understanding language? Third, to what extent do responses in perceptual and motor areas depend on the linguistic and extra-linguistic context? And can embodied theories accommodate language about abstract concepts? Based on the available evidence, we conclude that sensori-motor cortices are activated during a variety of language comprehension tasks, for both concrete and abstract language
The minimal predictions of an embodied theory of language understanding are that: (a) parts of our action and perception systems are involved in language understanding, and (b) this involvement is functional, constituting or contributing to the construction of meaning
Summary
Reviewed by: Carol Madden, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands Lisa Aziz-Zadeh, University of Southern California, USA. We review neurocognitive studies of language comprehension in healthy adults and evaluate their possible contributions to theories of language in the brain. Based on the available evidence, we conclude that sensori-motor cortices are activated during a variety of language comprehension tasks, for both concrete and abstract language. This activity depends on the context in which perception and action words are encountered. Modality-specific cortical activity is not a sine qua non of language processing even for language about perception and action, sensori-motor regions of the brain appear to make functional contributions to the construction of meaning, and should be incorporated into models of the neurocognitive architecture of language
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