Flat-Rate Pricing and Truthful Offloading Mechanism in Multi-Layer Edge Computing

Abstract

Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is a promising paradigm to ease the computation burden of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices by leveraging computing capabilities at the network edge. With the yearning needs for resource provision from IoT devices, the queueing delay at the edge nodes not only poses a colossal impediment to achieving satisfactory quality of experience (QoE) for the IoT devices but also to the benefits of the edge nodes owing to escalating energy expenditure. Moreover, since the service providers may differ, computationally competent entities' computing services should entail economic compensation for the incurred energy expenditure and the capital investment. Therefore, the workload allocation mechanism, where we consider flat-rate and dynamic pricing schemes in the multi-layer edge computing structure, is much-needed. We use Stackelberg game to capture the inherent hierarchy and interdependence between the second-layer edge node (SLEN) and first-layer edge nodes (FLENs). A truthful admission control mechanism grounded on the optimal workload allocation is designed for FLENs without violating end-to-end (E2E) latency requirements. We prove that a Stackelberg equilibrium with the E2E latency guarantee and truthfulness exists and can be reached through proposed algorithm. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of our scheme and illustrate several insights.