Abstract
Property rights are a widely advocated policy tool to encourage stewardship over a range of environmental goods. Despite the extent to which property rights are dependent upon law to work, economists rarely consider that property rights are enmeshed within a complex web of pre-existing national and international legal frameworks—such as human rights law—that put strict limitations on the way they operate. This important issue is illustrated here with reference to the legal struggles in the UK around the “ownership” of fishing rights. The social and economic changes under market-based management in the UK made the fisheries regulatory regime unpopular, and undoubtedly contributed to the overwhelming vote within the catch sector to leave the European Union, even though the responsibility to allocate fishing opportunities to the British fishing industry lay with the UK authorities. The lesson from the UK experience is that despite the legal-blindness of much resource economics, the application of economic theory should not outrun its legal foundations. We conclude that promoting the allocation of public fishing rights to the private sector without adequate safeguards—such as a valuation of the rights in question and carefully considered written terms and conditions—could be considered negligent.
Highlights
Private property rights are widely advocated as a tool for creating sustainable fisheries
We address the legal problem created by private property rights, which contribute to these rights being inflexible, captured, and potentially incompatible with a precautionary approach to harvesting from uncertain and dynamic ecosystems (Copes, 1998; Phillips et al, 2002; Acheson et al, 2015; Bromley, 2009)
As the issues presented above illustrate, the piecemeal introduction of the panacea of transferable quotas to manage fisheries has, in the UK, had significant legal and economic consequences that make management very difficult for government administrators
Summary
Private property rights are widely advocated as a tool for creating sustainable fisheries. In return for shared access to much of the EU’s waters (some 25 million km2), the UK has agreed to limit the catches of its fleet relative to other EU member states (at the time of their entry) under a doctrine known as “relative stability” (Churchill and Owen, 2009, p 154) This term is calculated on a stock-by-stock basis and relates to the landings of each species. The UK government managed TAC allocations centrally by setting monthly landings limits for fishing vessels At this time a number of large-scale operators were grouped into regional fish marketing organisations called producer organisations (POs). Transferability is a key aspect of the UK’s quota scheme overall, significant differences still exist in both the membership and management styles of the different POs
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
