Abstract
This paper considers alternative methods for regulating the stock externality in a common-property fishery. The methods considered are fiat price controls, a quota on the fish catch, and taxes on the size or value of the fish catch. When regulations must be formulated on the basis of incomplete information, these methods are not equivalent. It is shown that taxes are the preferred regulatory instrument whenever the regulatory authority is able to accurately monitor the size of the fish stock.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
