Abstract
This paper reviews some aspects of the literature on the design of fiscal policy rules in monetary unions. We consider the theoretical rationale that motivates the need for imposing fiscal policy rules in the context of a monetary union. Then we analyze mechanisms (other than rules) that can potentially enhance fiscal discipline. We discuss the recent thinking and practice on numerical fiscal policy rules and on fiscal policy rules as they emerge from the optimizing behavior of fiscal and monetary authorities in a monetary union.
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