Fiscal Federalism and Tax Reform in Brazil

Abstract

As in other federalist political systems, tax income distribution among the federal units is a long standing political issue in Brazil. From the nineties onwards, the political debate centered on tax reform has occupied the forefront of the national political agenda. This paper summarizes the current debate, focusing on the role of the federalist institutions as a main variable defining its contents and the amount of political power of the contending actors. The analysis begins with information on the historical background and organizational features of Brazilian federalism. In this description, the role of veto players in the federalist system is stressed. Their influence is shown to be able to preclude tax reforms required to adapt the Brazilian economy to the new global environment of investment and trade relations. Tax reform is deemed necessary by political leaders, by the business community and by the three levels of government in the country, but the necessary consensus in order to settle its terms is precluded as a result of the regional interests, enhanced by the federalist model of organizing national politics.