Fiscal autonomy and stabilization: an empirical analysis of US state governments

Abstract

PurposeEven though fiscal autonomy plays a role as one of the prerequisite conditions for fiscal decentralization, there has been little research into why fiscal autonomy is important or how it works for subnational governments. This study aims to examine the effectiveness of fiscal autonomy by using a panel dataset of US state governments from 2001 to 2013.Design/methodology/approachAccording to the results of general method of moments, the author find that fiscal autonomy leads to reducing volatility in total expenditures.FindingsIt indicates that fiscal autonomy is necessary for state governments performing one of the three Musgravian role of government (e.g. stabilization). However, when we look at the more detailed relationship between fiscal autonomy and volatility by applying expenditures from major categories such as capital outlay, general expenditure and public welfare, this study finds no statistically significant results. Interestingly, balanced budget requirement and tax and expenditure limitation indicate different effects on expenditure volatility, even though they belong to the same institutional factors.Originality/valueThis paper is meaningful because it can support the importance of fiscal autonomy on fiscal performance.