Firth and the Ethics of Belief

Abstract

I trust that I may begin on a personal note. It was one September day in 1938 that I first met Rod Firth when we both enrolled in Ralph Barton Perry's seminar on The General Theory of Value. Firth and I began almost at once to discuss and to argue about philosophy and we continued to do this for almost fifty years. I am honored and deeply moved to be able to take part in this symposium. One of topics that concerned both of us during all those years was what we both called question of the ethics of belief. We agreed that concept of justification is central to moral philosophy and also to theory of knowledge. But we could never agree about how two areas of justification are related. Is epistemic justification a subspecies of ethical justification or is it merely an analogue of ethical justification? Firth's inclination was to say that it is merely an analogue; and my inclination was to say that it is a subspecies. We both continued to follow our respective inclinations. But Firth's arguments became more and more subtle and profound and, in consequence, intricacies of problem became far more clear than they ever were before. Yet, for good or ill, I find myself still inclined to accept original view. I think that these are questions Rod would want me to discuss on this occasion.'