Abstract

When there is direct competition for a position of power (promotion, elected office, etc.), competitors are tempted to cheat to increase their chances of winning. If they do so successfully, then how they rationalize their cheating can determine how they treat the losers of the competition. In this paper, we explore how the winners of a promotion tournament treat the losers, using a two stage laboratory experiment run in Canada and the United Arab Emirates. In the first stage, subjects compete to earn the role of the dictator in a dictator game, which takes place in the second stage. We vary whether or not subjects can cheat during the competition. The results of the experiment can be summarized as follows: (1) cheating significantly increases altruism in some tournament winners, (2) winners who cheat the most are significantly less altruistic than winners who cheated only a little, (3) there are significant differences in cheating behavior across the two populations, and (4) cheating behavior can be at least partially attributed to differences in intelligence and beliefs across the two populations.

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