Abstract

Presents a methodology that may provide a radical new way of assuring the safety of software-based systems through a novel application of first principles enabled by micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) technology, i.e. silicon machinery. 'First principles' is defined as theory that is defensible through fundamental laws of nature in the chemical, physical or mechanical structure of materials or assemblages thereof. The proposed methodology is limited to 'passive safety' applications, i.e. those where a potential hazard is mitigated (assured safe) by means that do not require action or energy to maintain. The proposed methodology is based upon long-standing safety principles employed in nuclear weapons. It is proposed that two of these long-established principles be applied to high-consequence software systems. The nuclear weapon stronglink and the unique signal (UQS) concept are fundamental to nuclear weapon safety and represent the conceptual genesis of the approach taken in this paper. Incompatibility and isolation are the two fundamental nuclear weapon safety principles made possible by the nuclear weapon stronglink and UQS concepts.

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