First Person and Third Person Reasons and the Regress Problem

Abstract

This chapter argues that there are two types of epistemic reasons, one irreducibly first personal, and the other third personal. Third personal reasons are facts about the world or our minds. First personal reasons are states of consciousness such as experiences, feelings, or beliefs, not the fact that these states exist. The chapter argues that third person reasons give rise to an epistemic regress. However, a special kind of first personal reason, basic self-trust, ends the regress of third person reasons. Epistemic self-trust is the most basic reason there is. It is more basic than third person reasons and it is more basic than any other first person reasons. The regress problem arises from three assumptions: (a) A belief needs a reason, something on the basis of which I can settle for myself that the belief is true: (b) a reason needs a reason: and (c) the total set of reasons for a given belief form a single structure. The chapter rejects (c), and argues that the nature of self-trust makes it an exception to (b).