First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to private parking slot sharing

Abstract

This paper combines market design theory and sequential auction to settle the problem of parking space sharing and allocation in metropolitan areas during normal working hours. Firstly, a market mechanism, the PC-TTCC (price-compatible top trading cycles and chains) mechanism, is introduced to share private parking slots among agents. And after exchanging private parking slots that are fail to exchange are leased to the platform. Based on the historical auction price with weight, the platform pay the agents who offer their private parking slots. The platform manages these private parking slots and some public parking slots at the same time. Then, two auction mechanisms, the first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions mechanisms, are proposed to reallocate the parking slots received from agents and owned by platform cross the platform. In this paper, the PC-TTCC mechanism with rule e (PC-TTCC [e]) and first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions are effective. This work will contribute to the further research of the solutions in private parking slot sharing.