Firms’ shareholding behavior in green supply chains: Carbon emissions reduction, power structures, and technology spillovers

Abstract

Leaders in green supply chains are increasingly focusing on improving strategic synergy with followers through shareholding strategies. By constructing Stackelberg models, we explore the operational mechanisms in two models, manufacturer-led and retailer-led, which have forward and backward shareholding strategies, respectively. Compared with non-shareholding models, we find that the retailer's pricing becomes more sensitive to changes in the market environment after applying shareholding strategies, while the manufacturer's pricing depends on its power status. Interestingly, leaders and entire supply chains prefer shareholding strategies, while followers prefer shareholding strategies in good market environment or in bad market environment with their shares held by leaders below certain thresholds. Moreover, both forward and backward shareholding strategies can effectively promote carbon emissions reduction. Improving manufacturers' technology spillover positively impacts pricing and carbon emissions reduction and profits, and a reasonable shareholding ratio can encourage manufacturers to increase the level of technology spillover. Finally, a two-part tariff contract can effectively coordinate the vertical shareholding supply chain. The results provide decision guidance for managers in applying shareholding strategies to build a strategic alliance to improve firms' economic and environmental performance.