Abstract
How should we understand business interests in the welfare state when firms have strategic incentives to misrepresent their preferences? This article uses an event study to uncover firms’ preferences over social protection. We use the stock market’s response to proposed legal changes in employment and wage protection to test class- versus skill-based understandings of employer preferences. Using data from France between 1997 and 2003, we find evidence in favor of the skill-centered approach.
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