Abstract
AbstractWe document evidence that CEOs who lead firms that face higher climate change risk (CCR) receive higher equity‐based compensation. Our finding is consistent with the compensating wedge differential theory and survives numerous robustness and endogeneity tests. The result is more prominent for firms that are socially responsible, susceptible to higher environmental litigation and part of the non‐high‐tech industries. Furthermore, we find supportive evidence that firms offering higher equity incentives to their CEOs for managing higher CCR are usually better off in the long run via a lower cost of equity capital and higher firm valuation.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.