Fire Alarms, Garbage Cans, and the Administrative Presidency

Abstract

This exploratory essay offers an analytical framework for assessing the implications of the administrative presidency for what Heclo termed the "larger organizational life of government. " It begins by offering a four-cell typology of policy initiatives associated with the administrative presidency. The essay then links disparate types of political dynamics to these four types. A threefold argument is presented. First, presidential appointees using administrative strategies to alter agency agendas routinely find themselves trying to cope with "fire alarm " oversight. Second, the type of policy initiative pursued (quantum, emergent, convergent, and gradualist) will affect the nature, scope, and intensity of conflict spawned by this type of oversight (disintegrative, adversarial, manipulated agreement, and mutual accommodation). Finally, the dynamics illustrated indicate that the administrative presidency is more permeable to both micro- and macropolitical intervention than commonly portrayed by either its supporters or detractors. The essay concludes by suggesting areas of research that scholars interested in the administrative presidency might profitably pursue.