Abstract
This paper identifies instances of negative interplay between public and private enforcement of European Union (EU) competition law. For this purpose, a detailed account of the premises underlying the EU's dual enforcement system is provided against the background of efficiency, effectiveness, fundamental rights and proportionality. These four interests, both internal and external to the EU's competition policy, are at stake if liability in parallel enforcement proceedings is either excessive or uncoordinated. While actors involved in the enforcement process are gradually recognizing these risks, so far the solutions offered remain incidental.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
