Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between Arthur Fine’s “Natural Ontological Attitude” and the work of neo-pragmatists, particularly Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. I argue that many of the problems that face Fine’s account can be seen as a direct result of his failure to employ certain key pragmatist insights concerning the nature and status of the realism-antirealism issue. Consequently, I suggest that we should cease to think of Fine as representative of mainstream attempts to dispense with the realism-antirealism issue and instead view NOA as an unfortunate mixture of opposed philosophical traditions.
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