Finding the Road to the Last Mile: Civil-Military Operations and Effects of Mitigation on Stability and Reconstruction Operations (Nation-Building) in Iraq

Abstract

Initial US efforts to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraq were a failure. This failure was all but guaranteed by the mistaken confidence that senior levels of the US Government held in Iraqi Government capacity. Once the inability of the Iraqi Government to govern was realised, efforts to take over their responsibilities were equally fraught due to a lack of planning and properly skilled personnel. By this time, much critical time had been lost in establishing an effective information management plan, and insurgent propaganda had taken root. Substantial sums of money and prodigious effort were employed to rectify the governance and information problems, but to limited effect due to a further lack of planning. Having identified these problems and learned some difficult lessons, the US V Corps formed an integrated, synchronised “C24” cell at MNF-I, incorporating the C7 (Engineer), C8 (Comptroller) and C9 (Civil Military Operations, or CMO) positions into a “one stop shop” for CMO, synchronising its efforts and shaping all of V Corps into a powerful force for “constructive engagement”. Shortcomings still exist, however, and harnessing the full capabilities of the interagency is the only way to overcome them.