Abstract

This article will consider the relevance of the notion of autonomy within a particular body of international law, namely international environmental law. Without the existence of an over-arching institutional framework on which the autonomy of the discipline might be otherwise premised, the article considers the complexity of understanding and applying autonomy within a diverse field of legal rules and institutional settings. The article will suggest, at least in international environmental law, that the notion of autonomy encompasses a wide range of meanings, ranging from the perceived-utopian (the ‘fable’) right through to the perceived-dystopian (the ‘threat’). In fact, the reality of autonomy in international environmental law is perhaps more nuanced and incremental--though not necessarily any the less significant for all that.

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