Abstract
The current system of patent financing for prescription drug research leads to large and growing inefficiencies. In addition, patent rents create perverse incentives that can lead to both bad health outcomes and the slowing of the research process. This paper examines several alternative mechanisms for financing prescription drug research including a prize system, an auction-based patent buyout system and direct public funding for research. It outlines the advantages and disadvantages of each system by a series of criteria, including marginal cost pricing, openness of research findings, incentives for excessive marketing and the adequacy of research funding.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
