Financialized Growth and the Structural Power of Finance: Turkey's Debt-Led Growth Regime and Policy Response after the Crisis

Abstract

This article analyzes the Turkish central bank's “managed uncertainty” policy after the global financial crisis. During 2010–14, the central bank intentionally generated uncertainty around short-term interest rates, using the level of predictability faced by financiers as a tool to buffer the domestic economy from volatile capital flows. How did the central bank implement this unconventional policy? Building on interview data and public texts, the article argues that the surge in capital inflows after the crisis sourced a debt-led, financialized economic growth model and deepened Turkey's reliance on external financing. The central bank could diverge from the financial sector's policy preferences despite Turkey's increased foreign capital dependence because the availability of low-cost, ample, private funding opportunities temporarily expanded policymakers’ room to maneuver. However, operating vis-à-vis an unsustainable growth regime, the central bank had to revert to orthodoxy in 2014 due to declining investor confidence and capital flight. This article contributes to the literature on the structural power of finance by demonstrating how finance derives its structural power from funding financialized growth, not productive investments. It also shows that financial structural power varies based on the source and cost of external financing beyond the degree of foreign capital dependence.