Abstract
Earlier studies have shown that numerous factors may influence the propensity to engage in explorative and exploitative innovation activities, and one of the main antecedents is whether a firm has sufficient resources to pursue these complex tasks. However, deploying financial slack to pursue explorative and exploitative innovation activities requires a control mechanism to monitor and mitigate managerial risk-taking and protect the interest of minority shareholders. We therefore posit that the relationship between financial slack and different types of innovation behavior may be moderated by the control mechanisms that are imposed on the managers. We extend this argument in the context of Taiwan to investigate how different characteristics of board composition influence the relationship between financial slack and the intensity of explorative and exploitative innovation activities. The longitudinal dataset used in this study is composed of the Taiwanese electronic companies which were publicly listed on ...
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