Abstract
The development of supply chain finance, its pricing strategy for bilateral business cooperation between e‐commerce, banking institutions, and fourth‐party logistics services providers has gained the attention of researchers. This paper combines the heterogeneous network location verification technology, starting from information asymmetry and Rubens bargaining game ideas, and combines it with game theory methods to provide a reference for bilateral cooperation decision‐making on e‐commerce platforms. The experiment results indicated the pricing decisions of e‐commerce platforms which are affected by the efforts of the other party and the ability of bargaining. The quoted price increases with the decrease of the bank’s ability and the increase of the service provider’s ability. The pricing decisions of banks and service providers are only affected by the direct proportion of their respective business costs. When considering the introduction of incentive mechanism conditions, it is found that appropriate incentive conditions can increase the quotation of the e‐commerce platform. The price quoted by the e‐commerce platform that chooses to bargain with the bank is higher than the price quoted by the bank after negotiating with the service provider, which will help to better realize the benefits. Finally, the paper numerically analyzes the results of the bargaining game between e‐commerce platforms and banks and fourth‐party logistics service providers, and the numerical results verify the better performance.
Highlights
In recent years, with the rapid development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), Internet of Things (IoTs), new retail, and digital finance, the supply chain finance model has been innovated
Many scholars have carried out research on relevant aspects of supply chain finance, and their main content is concentrated on model development and operation, online, and offline risk management issues but there are few studies on bilateral cooperation pricing of e-commerce platforms
When establishing the game model, this paper considers that the platform revenue is mainly derived from the pricing income of the bank’s credit entrustment business and deducts the pricing expenses of the product logistics service business with the fourth-party service provider
Summary
With the rapid development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), Internet of Things (IoTs), new retail, and digital finance, the supply chain finance model has been innovated. E-commerce platforms play an increasingly important role in the operation of supply chain finance and promote the optimal allocation of online and offline resources and information sharing This development trend towards multiplatform cooperation has gained the interest. Many scholars have carried out research on relevant aspects of supply chain finance, and their main content is concentrated on model development and operation, online, and offline risk management issues but there are few studies on bilateral cooperation pricing of e-commerce platforms. From the perspective of e-commerce platforms, it is rare to use bilateral bargaining models to analyze the pricing issues of cooperating with banking institutions and service providers at the same time.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
