Abstract

This chapter explores correspondences between the costs and benefits of financial and circus safety nets. The author stresses the idea that the character of a country's net cannot be static. It must adapt promptly to changes in the market, legal, bureaucratic, and ethical problems it is intended to alleviate. Safety nets expand over time for two reasons. First, large firms whose operations lie formally outside the net have strong incentives to make themselves too difficult for authorities to fail and unwind in crisis circumstances. Second, in good times, safety-net managers underinvest in crisis planning. As a result, crisis-generated changes in the ordering of regulatory norms dispose them to rescue firms that are difficult to fail and unwind without holding themselves closely accountable for either the costs or the distributional effects of the subsidies the rescue engenders.

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