Abstract
This study finds that better reporting quality is associated with less uncertainty about credit risk as captured by disagreement among the credit rating agencies. Further, reporting quality is more important in reducing uncertainty when debt market participants lack access to private information. Finally, I use the quasi-natural experiment induced by SFAS 142, which the literature indicates reduced reporting quality, to mitigate endogeneity concerns and find increased disagreement among the rating agencies after the implementation of SFAS 142 for firms with significant goodwill. I contribute to the literature on the role of reporting quality in debt markets and on debt market information intermediaries.
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