Abstract
This study examines a setting in which a tax reporting decision is delegated to a firm's tax manager. Using financial accounting measures of tax expense to evaluate the tax manager allows the fi rm to efficiently attain the level of tax avoidance it prefers, despite the fact that the consequences of the tax reporting decision will occur in the future. The study also examines how well two accounting measures of tax aggressiveness -- cash taxes paid and the unrecognized tax bene fit -- distinguish between conservative and aggressive fi rms.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
