Abstract

This chapter moves from the context of insecurity encompassing Turkish–Iraqi relations in the post-Gulf War era. Uncertainty in northern Iraq sets parameters of partial cooperation for this episode shaped by the US invasion (2003). Largely due to the lingering of the civil war in Iraq, Turkey’s partial cooperation dilemma was deepened. Under those circumstances, Ankara adopted an ambivalent approach to interplay partial cooperation in between Baghdad and Erbil. On one hand, engagement with Erbil was deemed inevitable for Ankara. On the other hand, Turkey had to refrain from challenging central authority in Baghdad, which might lead to undesired outcomes such as Kurdish independence over northern Iraq. Partial ontology and divided rhetoric have inherently kept Turkey far from fulfilling its longstanding dream of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq.

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