Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the twentieth Century

Abstract

Reviewed by: Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century Jessica Priselac (bio) Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, by Benjamin Valentino (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) 317 pages. $29.95. Episodes of genocide in the 20th century have been blamed on many "root causes"—hatred among ethnic groups, unresolved historical grievances, the embrace of a radical ideology, etc. The international system's record in preventing or resolving these types of conflicts was abysmal. Unable to handle these conflicts in an effective manner, diplomats and leaders became defensive and began to blame their failures on the nature of the conflict itself. Describing the war in the former Yugoslavia in 1992, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger commented that "[t]his war is not rational. There is no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut, it is hatred; it's not for any set of values or purposes; it just goes on. And that kind of warfare is most difficult to bring to a halt."1 His comments reflected the view of a significant portion of the policy community—a view that leaves little hope that such atrocities can be prevented in the future. In his excellent book, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Benjamin A. Valentino, an assistant professor of Government at Dartmouth College, argues that the characteristics of a society do not, in fact, determine whether mass killing and genocide will occur within it. Instead, Valentino convincingly asserts that there is a "strategic logic" to mass killing and that it is used when powerful groups within a society believe that it is the best way to achieve their political or military objectives. In essence, Valentino believes that when leaders choose to embark on the path to genocide, they do so for reasons that are far from irrational. After defining mass killing as the intentional killing of noncombatants resulting in 50,000 or more deaths within a five-year period, Valentino examines a number of specific cases to explain his theory. In this "strategic approach" to assessing mass killing, Valentino divides his case studies into three types: Communist, ethnic and counter-guerrilla. He examines the communist regimes of Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot; mass killing based on ethnicity in Rwanda, Nazi Germany, and Turkey; and mass killings during counter-guerrilla operations in the Guatemalan civil war and under the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. One of Valentino's central arguments is that "characteristics of society at large, such as pre-existing cleaves, hatred and discrimination between groups and non-democratic forms of government, are of limited utility in distinguishing societies at high risk for mass killing." Valentino's strongest arguments in support of this statement are his comparative studies of regimes that committed mass killing with similar regimes that did not. Why did genocide take place [End Page 207] in racist Nazi Germany while it did not take place in South Africa? Why did mass killings occur in Communist Cambodia but not in Vietnam? His answers are compelling. Through his case studies, he presents evidence that, in each case, a concentrated group of leaders is generally responsible for formulating and organizing the mass killings after concluding that this is the best way for them to advance their own interests and solidify their power. Moreover, leaders do not need widespread support in order to conduct such policies; in each case, a relatively small group of people carried out the actual killings. In essence, Valentino argues that the overall characteristics of a society have little to do with whether or not it is at risk for genocide, because leaders who devise these plans are not responding to a society's calls for action, nor do they need a majority of society to support their actions for the results to be deadly. Despite the popular perception, these killings are not done for killing's sake—they are done with a specific goal in mind. Leaders take these actions after coming to believe that the alternative paths to their goals are either impractical or unfeasible. Valentino emphasizes that while mass killing can be seen as a strategic decision, this does not mean that...