Abstract

Sentences involving disjunctions under a possibility modal give rise to so-called ‘free choice’ inferences, i.e. inferences to the effect that each disjunct is possible. This note investigates the interaction between free choice and presuppositions. We focus on sentences embedding both a disjunction in the scope of a possibility modal and a presupposition trigger, and we investigate how the free choice inference triggered by the former can contribute to filtering the presupposition of the latter. We consider three cases: conditionals, disjunctions and unless sentences. We observe that in all of these cases the presuppositions triggered from the consequent, second disjunct, or the scope of unless appear to be filtered by a free choice inference associated with the rest of the sentence. The case of the conditional can be accommodated by scalar accounts of free choice, but the disjunction and unless cases cause a substantial problem for all these accounts. After discarding a natural but unsuccessful attempt at a solution, we consider two more promising strategies. The first holds on to an implicature account of free choice and exploits an algorithm of free insertion of redundant material. The second is based on a semantic account of free choice based on a notion of homogeneity. Each of these solutions comes with related problems. We conclude that the correct form of a theory of free choice remains open, though the data concerning the interaction between free choice and presupposition can significantly help sharpen our theoretical choices. EARLY ACCESS

Highlights

  • Sentences involving disjunctions under a possibility modal give rise to so-called ‘free choice’ inferences, i.e. inferences to the effect that each disjunct is possible

  • We focus on the interaction between free choice phenomena and presupposition projection: in particular, we show that all scalar accounts have difficulties explaining patterns of presupposition projection and filtering in some complex sentences that involve free choice effects

  • The sentence in (2) as a whole appears to carry no suggestion that Maria can go study in Japan, despite the fact that the second disjunct contains a presupposition trigger, associated with that presupposition (S is the first in our family to C presupposes that S C-ed or is C-ing)

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Summary

Introduction

Sentences involving disjunctions under a possibility modal give rise to so-called ‘free choice’ inferences, i.e. inferences to the effect that each disjunct is possible. The sentence in (2) as a whole appears to carry no suggestion that Maria can go study in Japan, despite the fact that the second disjunct contains a presupposition trigger, associated with that presupposition (S is the first in our family to C presupposes that S C-ed or is C-ing). For filtering to occur, the clause Maria can’t go study in Tokyo or Boston needs to trigger a free choice reading when computing the presuppositions of the sentence. The second is based on a semantic account of free choice (Goldstein 2018) Both these strategies can account for our data, but have problems.

The implicature approach to free choice
Presupposition filtering and projection
The problem: filtering free choice
A nonstarter: split exhaustification
Two proposals
Filtering free choice and free insertion
22 Where classical equivalence is defined as follows:
Problems for the free insertion account
Filtering free choice and semantic accounts
27 Where contextual equivalence is defined as follows:
Open issues for the semantic approach
A note on the predicted truth conditions
Conclusion
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