File sharing in cloud computing using win stay lose shift strategy

The impact of the cardinal relationships amongpecuniary payoffs, and of social history and reputation, on thechoice of strategies in four one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma games isexperimentally examined. The results suggest that normalized payoffvalues linked to ``fear'' and ``greed'' are important as predictorsof behavior in the PD games. Success in coordinating on the payoffdominant equilibrium in previous plays of coordination games alsoincreases the probability of cooperative play in the PD games. Theeffect of past play is strongest when individuals are matchedrepeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted tobeing matched randomly with another player.

This research paper delves into the potential of using blockchain technology and the Interplanetary File System (IPFS) for file sharing. The current state of file sharing is analyzed, and it is found that centralized servers pose many challenges, such as security and privacy issues. The paper then investigates how blockchain and IPFS can provide a decentralized and secure solution for file sharing. The analysis of specific use cases and existing projects such as File Coin, which utilizes IPFS and a blockchain-based marketplace to allow users to rent out unused storage space, is also presented. The paper also addresses the limitations and challenges of using this technology, including scalability and regulatory issues. The research concludes that the combination of blockchain and IPFS has the potential to revolutionize the way digital content is shared and distributed, providing new opportunities for secure and efficient file sharing. The paper also explores other decentralized storage solutions, such as Sia, Storj, and MaidSafe, and how they compare to IPFS and blockchain-based file-sharing solutions. The research also evaluates the potential impact of this technology on various sectors, such as the media, entertainment, and healthcare industries. Overall, this research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the topic and its potential impact on the future of file sharing. The advancement of technology has impacted the way information is shared and distributed, with traditional file-sharing methods facing numerous security and privacy challenges. This research paper investigates the potential of using blockchain technology and the Interplanetary File System (IPFS) for file sharing as a means of addressing these challenges. This research paper argues that the combination of blockchain technology and IPFS holds great promise for the future of file sharing.

In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all, tax system, a common tool to adjust the temperature of the economy, is widely used in human society. Inspired by this philosophy, players in this study would pay corresponding taxes in accordance with their payoff level. In this way, public benefit fund is established consequently and it would be utilized to punish defectors. There are two main methods for punishing: slight intensity of punishment (shortly, SLP) and severe intensity of punishment (shortly, SEP). When the totaling of public benefit fund keeps relatively fixed, SLP extends further, which means more defectors would be punished; by contrast, SEP has a smaller coverage. It is of interest to verify whether these two measures can promote cooperation and which one is more efficient. Simulate results reveal that both of them can promote cooperation remarkably. Specifically speaking, SLP shows constant advantage from the point of view either of fractions of cooperation or average payoff.

We consider a spatial generalization of evolutionary game theory in which strategies are distributed over a spatial array of sites. We assume that the strategy corresponding to a given site has local interactions with the strategies sitting on neighbouring sites, and that the strategies change if neighbouring strategies are doing better. After briefly setting the stage with a formal definition of spatial evolutionary game theory, we consider the spatial extension of the Hawk-Dove game, and we show that the results are qualitatively different from those obtained from classical evolutionary game theory. For example, the proportion of Hawks in the population is in general lower in the spatial game than in the classical one. We also consider spatial generalizations of the extensions of the Hawk-Dove game obtained by including strategies such as Retaliator and Bully. Here, too, the results from the spatial game are very different from the classical results. In particular, with space Retaliator is a much more successful strategy than one would expect from classical considerations. This suggests that, in general, spatial structure may facilitate the evolution of strategies such as Retaliator, which do not necessarily prosper classically, and which are reminiscent of the \`nice', \`provokable' and `forgiving' strategies which seem to play a central role in the evolution of cooperation. The results indicate that including spatial structure in evolutionary game theory is a fruitful extension.

The Residency Match: Escaping the Prisoner's Dilemma.

A tragedy of the commons, in which rational behavior of individuals to maximize their own payoffs depletes common resources, is one of the most important research topics in game theory. To better understand the social dilemma problem, recent studies have developed a theoretical framework of feedback-evolving game where individual behavior affects an environmental (renewable) resource and the environmental resource changes individual payoffs. While previous studies assumed that the frequency of defectors increases (prisoner's dilemma [PD] game) when the environmental resource is abundant to investigate an oscillating tragedy of the commons, it is also possible for other types of game to produce the social dilemma. In this paper, we extend the feedback-evolving game by considering not only PD game, but also the other three game structures when the environmental resource is replete for a reasonably complete classification. The three games are Chicken game where defectors and cooperators coexist through minority advantage, Stag-Hunt (SH) game with minority disadvantage, and Trivial game where the frequency of cooperators increases. In addition, we utilize a dilemma phase plane to visually track (transient) dynamics of game structure changes. We found that an emergent initial condition dependence (i.e. bistability) is pervasive in the feedback-evolving game when the three games are involved. We also showed that persistent oscillation dynamics arise even with Chicken or SH games in replete environments. Our generalized analysis will be an important step to further extend the theoretical framework of feedback-evolving game to various game situations with environmental feedback.

Cloud storage is gaining popularity to store and share files. To secure the files, cloud storage providers supply client interfaces with the facility to encrypt the files and upload them into the cloud. When client-side encryption is done, the onus of key management lies with the cloud user. Public key proxy re-encryption mechanisms can be used to distribute the key among stakeholders of the file. However, clients use low powered devices like mobile phones to share their files. Lightweight cryptography operations are needed to carry out the encryption operations. Ring-LWE-based encryption scheme meets this criterion. In this work, a proxy re-encryption scheme is proposed to distribute the file key. The scheme is proved CCA secure under Ring-LWE assumption in the random oracle model. The performance of the scheme is compared with the existing proxy re-encryption schemes which are observed to show better performance for re-encryption and re-key generation.

Smart file sharing is the software used to share files between the two or many devices. Wireless file sharing with current wireless sharing approaches lack in giving sufficient features to users who frequently share files, so it cannot satisfy both senders and receivers. Sharing process between cross platform might not result in good performance due to device constraints or result in poor user experience due to various Operating System versions and hardware configurations in low end wireless Smart Phones. Security is a major risk with live sharing feature. In order to avoid hacking of files by unauthorized users this software method will make the user place a file to transfer one time and many users can have access to it from their mobile device so that sender need notsend the same file to multiple users. This system acts like a temporary cloud (or) like a buffet system. This file sharing is mainly focused on media files sharing through Wi-Fi Bluetooth in wireless device like smart phone devices. This software will learn the environment of each data which needs to be shared and will decide what should be sent and what should be authenticated, and who can access a particular file. This software will notify each transaction for getting it verified by senders. The most important new feature is that receivers can browse the files in sender's devices from their own devices using Live Sharing feature to select whatthey need. This process of file sharing is applicable for sharing file with enterprises corporate industries, social network communities etc.

Cloud computing is based on utility and consumption of computer resources. To solve the security issues in cloud computing, secure computing protocols are often used. Recently, rational parties as a new kind of parties are proposed, who wish to maximize their utilities in secure computing protocols. The utility definitions in most previous rational secure computing protocols derive from prisoner's dilemma game (PD game). In two-party rational computing protocols, parties decide to send their shares according to their utilities. Recently, we revisit the incentives for rational parties in secure computing protocols and give new utility definitions according to them. We find that the new utility definition is not similar to PD game any more. We discuss two-party and multi-party cases, respectively, and prove that parties have incentives to send their share to others. Furthermore, we also prove that parties can maximize their utilities in both cases.

Cloud storage provides the simpler way to share the files privately and publicly. A good Cloud Storage Provider (SCP) is not only measured by the access speed or file size that can be shared to others, but also regarding the security issues in file sharing itself. In this paper, we analyze the security of file sharing in 3 Chinese CSPs, which are: Baidu, Weiyun and Kanbox. Those CSPs have their own vulnerabilities that successfully revealed. We also provide some suggestions to countermeasure the weaknesses so that they can maintain the quality while improving the security. Keywords— cloud computing, cloud storage, file sharing, security

A long (150-trial) PD game, played for money, was used to study the developmental effects of motive constellations and first-trial outcome on coopera tion-conflict behavior. Game partners were matched for their dominance in the TAT-measured needs for achievement, affiliation, or power. Results were: (a) the motive groups developed considerably different levels of cooperation-conflict by the end of the games; (b) some motive groups did not behave as hypothesized; (c) first-trial outcomes affected subsequent behavior, but the effects "washed out" by the end of the games. The discussion emphasized the appropriateness of the systems model for understanding personality and situational effects in social interaction.

The main purpose of this study is to apply the "selective play paradigm" to explain how cooperation emerges in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas. A unique feature of the selective play paradigm is the option for not playing a PD game. For this purpose, a computer simulation of 100-actor groups was conducted. At the beginning of each replication, each simulated actor was randomly assigned to one of eleven levels of trust, which indicates the actor's estimate of the overall cooperation rate in the group. Each simulated actor, then, decided whether or not to interact with the previous partner based on the calculated expected gains from interacting with one of the other partners. Results of the simulation show that: (1) when substantial opportunity costs exist, having a high level of trust benefits the actor; (2) the above effect of trust depends on the actor's cooperativeness in PD games; (3) but does not depend on the overall cooperation rate in the group.

The ultimate goal of game theory is to provide a theoretical model for strategic situations' analysis, i.e. for situations where one actor's choice depends on the behavior of other players in the game. As a concept, game theory is also applicable to the legal context. Legal dialectics and processes are often conducted in some form of strategic interactions. Game theory is a way to see how legal rules affect particular actors' behavior. International Economic Law has its own dynamics which makes the process similar to the analysis through the game theoretical tools. Therefore, the rules of international law are considered as the rules of the game that are taking place among different actors. Game theoretical considerations clarify the substance of the interaction and cooperation of players involved (states, international organizations and other actors). Game theory provides a basis for normative analysis of the issue of implementation of the rules of international law and improves understanding of those rules. The topic of the paper is the application of the game theory in the context of the legal framework established by the World Trade Organization. The member states' dilemma between using the advantages and liberalization options provided by the WTO on the one hand, and joining the regional trade agreements, on the other one, is strategic by nature. Therefore, game theory can contribute to understanding and resolving, using the game of 'prisoner's dilemma' as a model. It is the game which clearly shows that a group of rational egoists can end up worse than a group of actors that acts prima facie contrary to their own interests. 'Prisoner's dilemma' demonstrates why society and law has the need for coordination as well as mechanisms for co-operation. WTO member states put emphasis on the process of liberalization conducted in the framework of regional trade agreements (RTAs); at the same time, their participation in WTO negotiations is not effective and efficient enough to make a breakthrough in the multilateral framework. A solution of the game for Member States is not to cooperate: i. e, liberalization is primarily achieved through regional agreements rather than within the WTO. The rational decision of the Member States (opting for a regional approach) has resulted in a suboptimal result, which is a basic characteristic of the game model based on a prisoner's dilemma: in this case, the optimal solution would be cooperation through a multilateral framework (World Trade Organization).

For decades, social scientists have been studying empirical tendencies of human subjects to cooperate in laboratory Prisoner's Dilemma settings. Here is what we are learning. 13.1 Introduction In a classic Prisoner's Dilemma, players choose independently whether to contribute toward a mutually desirable outcome. Cooperation comes at a cost, so that (for example) a dollar's contribution yields a return of more than a dollar to the group but less than a dollar to the individual contributor. Thus contributing is optimal for the group and suboptimal for the individual. Not contributing is a dominant strategy , which is to say, standard game theory predicts defection. If players prefer higher to lower monetary playoffs, and if other things are equal so far as a player is concerned, a player will not contribute. And yet, among the more robust findings to come out of experimental economics is that human players do not behave as game theory predicts. In laboratory Prisoner's Dilemmas, individual contributions toward the group good can be substantial. In iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas – multi-period games where each period viewed in isolation has the structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma – game theory does not so straightforwardly predict defection. Iterations allow players to implement strategies of reciprocity, including the simple but effective strategy of Tit-for-Tat (Axelrod 1984), which means responding to cooperation by cooperating and responding to defection by defecting. In iterated laboratory games, the phenomenon of human subjects making substantial contributions is likewise robust. However, it also is a robust result that cooperative relations tend to crumble in an iterated game's final period (when players know in advance that a given period is the final one). Typically, levels of cooperation remain positive, but decay in the direction predicted by standard game theory. Laboratory experiments can test theories about how people behave in a Prisoner's Dilemma. Experiments also can test policy proposals .

In the world of cloud computing, millions of people are using cloud computing for the purpose of business, education and socialization. Examples of cloud applications are: Google Drive for storage, Facebook for social networks, etc. Cloud users use the cloud computing infrastructure thinking that these services are easy and safe to use. However, there are security and performance issues to be addressed. This paper discusses how cloud users and cloud providers address performance and security issues. In this research, we have used business process modelling and simulation to explore the performance characteristics and security concerns in the service development life cycle. The results show that Business Process Modelling Notations (BPMN) simulation is effective for the study of cloud security process in detail before actual implementation. The total simulation duration time was 51 days and 9 h 40 min but the results are displayed in 7 s only.