Abstract

Abstract : This monograph on military theory examines the subject of fire support effectiveness and responsiveness. In 1987 the fire support effectiveness rate as measured by the Army's Combat Training Centers was 60%. Despite the Army's effort to improve its ability to fight with fires, the effectiveness rate as of February, 2000, had declined to 12%. This factual evidence complements the perceptions of senior Army leaders who criticize the fire support community for failing to provide the supported maneuver formation with responsiveness fire support. The examination of theory explains how the Army's centralized control of fires to facilitate massing of fires, coupled with a poorly developed digital fire control system are the root causes of failure. Theory is further used to predict the role of fires in the future and shows that centralized control works directly against the Army's focus on high tempo, decisive maneuver operations. This document aims to change the Army view's on how it controls and fights with indirect fires at the brigade level and below. In essence, a shift from centralized control to decentralized control would improve both effectiveness and responsiveness while also setting into motion establishment of a foundation from which to support 21st Century Warfare.

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