Fighting the good fight? Legitimating violence in a world of contested and contingent moral frameworks

Abstract

Starting from violence's widely acknowledged status as a wrong, this article critically explores attempts to legitimate violence through appeals to moral frameworks that determine the ends for which violence may be employed. Recognizing that such frameworks exist on all sides of violent conflict, it argues that since there will never be complete agreement on their content or application, nor complete certainty about which moral framework is the ‘correct’ one, it becomes impossible to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate violence either non-controversially or with certainity. Two problems result: our own ‘legitimate’ violence may reproduce rather than limit violence by sparking ‘legitimate’ violence in return, and our own use of violence may actually be unjust, despite our intentions. If we wish to avoid these problems yet maintain our moral commitments – however contested or contingent – we must employ nonviolent means to wage our conflicts, as such means remain legitimate despite disagreement or uncertainty regarding ends.