Abstract

ABSTRACT During the COVID-19 crisis, the European Parliament (EP) had an opportunity to shape Europe’s economic recovery and strengthen its institutional prerogatives through the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Despite influencing policies and securing soft account-holding powers, the EP failed to assert itself as a budgetary authority in the RRF implementation process. Budgetary authority is a fundamental element in democratic governance as it allows elected representatives to supervise the allocation of public funds and enforce accountability for government spending choices. This article explains the EP’s failure to maximise its budgetary powers and argues that the urgency of the crisis and the strategic use of norm-based arguments inadvertently undermined its bargaining position. The EP’s entrapment in its own rhetorical action is proposed as the main explanation for this outcome. The EP had long emphasised key aspects of the RRF, such as financing through common European debt issuance. As even the most hesitant member states eventually agreed on many of these issues, the EP could not obstruct or delay negotiations without being publicly exposed for inconsistencies between its past rhetoric and present actions. Consequently, it risked being shamed for prioritising its institutional ego over the common European interest.

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