Abstract
This chapter addresses the existence and nature of fictional entities. It identifies two distinct conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities, each of which is grounded by a reference-fixing rule of fiction institutions. One of these rules describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are not constituted by anything, while the other describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are constituted by other things. It identifies the metaphysical dependence base for the existence of fictional entities and argues that this does not include anything metaphysically mysterious. It then describes the nature of fictional entities and their identity and individuation conditions. Finally, it compares the account fictional entities provided with that of Amie Thomasson and argues that, despite obvious similarities, there are fundamental differences between the accounts.
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