Abstract
Abstract This chapter begins with the problem of what counts as true in a given fiction, beyond what’s explicitly given in that fiction. It then considers the problem of inconsistent fictions, which are naturally handled using impossible worlds. An account of truth in fiction is presented, which develops one of Lewis’s analyses into an approach which can handle inconsistent fictions with ease. The chapter then turns to the second main topic: how we should think about fictional entities. Realism and fictionalism about fictional characters are contrasted. A third option is then considered, which takes the Meinongian line that fictional characters are non-existent objects. Several versions of this idea and their various issues are discussed.
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