Abstract
The specific topic of this chapter is the difference between the attempt in speculative and dialectical thinking on the one hand, and transcendental phenomenology on the other, to solve the enigmas presented by Kant’s transcendental deduction. The thesis is that they are diametrically opposed. The main concern is systematic and not philological-historical. That means, among other things, that the well-known fact that Husserl has a certain preference for the deduction in edition A and that Fichte refers mostly to edition B will not be corroborated in an interpreting of all the passages in both in which they refer to the deduction. What is at stake is a general systematic and theoretical explanation of this and other facts due to the fundamental difference in the foundations of their projects and their understandings of nature of transcendental philosophy.
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