Fichte and the Possibility of Time Travel

Abstract

From perspective of everyday experience, it may seem odd that according to Einstein's special theory of relativity space and time form a symmetrical partnership in compound entity space-time;1 for there appear to be fundamental differences between space and time. It is, for example, generally taken as self-evident that, practical difficulties notwithstanding, while we are able to anywhere in space, we have no choice with regard to direction of our travel in time. In present essay, however, intend to argue that when space and time are viewed in light of Fichte's Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy this asymmetry between space and time can be seen to be as fundamental as one might expect. A surprising consequence of this is that into past is possible-so long as we understand travel in a slightly unusual sense. A Sketch of Fichte's Theory of and Fichte is generally held to be a very difficult philosopher. Arguably, however, this difficulty pertains to minutiae of his work; for his fundamental ideas, as they are relevant to my purposes in this essay, are easily summarized. In following (necessarily reductive) section, shall present such a summary. am assuming that reader has a basic familiarity with Fichte's philosophy; my intention is simply to highlight those aspects of it that will be most relevant to my goals. Central to Fichte's philosophy, as it is expounded in Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy, are notions of I and The notion of is reasonably self-evident: it is thinking (and feeling and intuiting)2 self: consciousness.3 This is foundational: it posits itself immediately, that is, without the presence of some sort of substrate (Fichte 1992, 96). Because of this absence of a substrate, when Fichte says that possesses consciousness, consciousness is to be assigned character of a mere predicate. What, then, is Not-I? At first glance, idea that Fichte's idealist philosophy should even contain a Not-I seems strange; for Not-I arguably connotes not-idealist and perhaps, therefore, even realist. But drawing such a conclusion would be a mistake: to Fichte, both and not-I are ultimately composed of thought;4 not-I is simply that part of our thought which is unyielding, that which is beyond our conscious control. Fichte puts argument like this: Being is characteristic feature of Not-I. Activity is what characterizes I.... Insofar as activity of is in a passive state of repose . . . Fs activity is annihilated by Not-I. . . .The I, which lies within sphere of what is intended, and Not-I, which lies within sphere of what is discovered, are one and same. These simply represent two, inseparably linked, aspects or ways of looking at same thing, for must be a subject-object. (Fichte 1992, 131-32) In a sense, gives something to kick against: otherwise we should find ourselves in a wholly unresisting-and, hence, ultimately imperceptible-void.5 Reciprocally, to Fichte gives its being; for as all reality is ultimately thought, only activity of can structure this raw material of thought. seen this way, relationship between and is one of mutual, necessary, and (as presence of word not in Not-I might lead us to expect) therefore logical (a priori) dependence; one might express it by means of biconditional: ≡ Not-I. Given that a logical relationship between and arises so naturally and primordially in Fichte's system, it is reasonable to enquire whether other relationships of logicality and a priority arise as naturally. What, for example, is status of space in his system, and how is to be explained fact that geometrical laws are necessarily true? Fichte provides following comments: It is worth noting that controversy that has recently arisen over space is similar to controversy concerning nature of a thing: is it given or is it produced? …