Feminism and Epistemology: What Kind of Successor Science?

Abstract

In this paper, I address recent feminist epistemological claims - in particular, those associated with `standpoint theory' and `feminist postmodernism' - arguing that they share difficulties with other forms of anti-positivist social theory and contribute to an impasse in social inquiry which is becoming increasingly acute. This impasse is traced to the displacement of explanation from the centre of theoretical concerns. In arguing this, I am not, however, proposing a return to positivist social science. The view that explanation can be equated with positivism - that `empirical' equals `empiricism' - is a common misconception. It has led some advocates of a distinct feminist epistemology to describe much research on gender issues as `feminist empiricism'. Such research, they argue, involves a paradoxical or contradictory reliance upon the very `masculine' epistemological criteria which feminist theory has done so much to challenge. In this paper I shall criticise this argument, proposing instead a `post-positivist' position in which empirical research is at the heart of any feminist challenge to mainstream approaches and the reconstruction of social theory.