Abstract
The paper deals with a problem of optimal management of a common-property fishery, modelled as a two-player differential game. Under nonclassical assumptions on harvest rates and utilities, a feedback Nash equilibrium is determined, using a bionomic equilibrium concept. Later on, this assumption is relaxed and a feedback Nash equilibrium is established under minimal hypotheses.
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