Fee or free checking? Noninterest checking account fees, competition and multimarket banking

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article analyses noninterest checking (NIC) account fees using a unique data set covering 11 875 observations on 1880 banks from 2008 to 2012. These data identify whether the bank has free or fee checking on NIC accounts and, where relevant, the fee and minimum balance to avoid the fee. Appealing to shrouded equilibrium theory, we hypothesize that banks, and particularly small banks, will avoid drawing the attention of myopic, low-income types by having stable policies, or will attempt to confuse depositors with contradictory policy shifts in the fee and minimum balance requirements. Competition and small bank size should favour consumers, but the meaning of ‘favour’ is complicated by large depositors and the banks subsidizing small depositors with NIC accounts.The results support the avoid attention hypothesis, particularly for single-market banks, and weakly support the confuse depositors hypothesis. The largest banks, including three too big to fail banks, are most responsive to competition, with single-market banks far less responsive. Competition may be responsible for a dramatic decline in free checking among the largest banks, and substantial increases in minimum balances for those banks, since these effectively reduced subsidies. Simultaneously, single-market banks became more likely to offer free checking.