Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf Mineral Resources

Abstract

Development of the vast petroleum reserves of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) by oil lease sales generates great amounts of revenue for th federal government, but the states, as owners of many areas of the coastal land mass, bear the brunt of the problems of cost and of adverse environmental effects. Local interests, to the extent they are denied participation in planning the exploitation of offshore oil, can be expected to try to impede federal plans for rapid development of these resources. The sources of state power--proprietary, the police--powers, and statutory--are analyzed in relation to the federal powers and examines areas where the states can use court litigation to obstruct federal plans. Reliance on the judiciary as a channel for political input and for redress would be unwise, as it would create a checkerboard of conflicting adjudications, not to mention the costs in terms of time and money. With the aim of achieving the dual national goals of energy production and protection of the coastlines, proposals are made that would increase state decisionmaking at the initial stages and make the resource bureaucrats in the various federal departments more accountable to the political process.